Introduction -- The Border Crossed Us: Current Issues in Immigrant Labor by Wishnie, Michael J
HeinOnline -- 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 389 2003-2004
INTRODUCTION
THE BORDER CROSSED US:
CURRENT ISSUES IN IMMIGRANT LABOR
MICHAEL J. WISHNIE*
A group of unionized Latino, Chinese, and Polish workers in a Manhattan
garment factory complain to the factory owner about his failure to pay overtime
as required by law, and some workers file administrative complaints with the
New York Department of Labor. In retaliation, the owner fires the workers who
filed complaints. When the union grieves the discharges and the Department of
Labor notifies the factory owner of his overtime liability, the owner casts about
for another strategy to punish his workers and, hopefully, evade his overtime
obligations. Choosing a familiar path, the owner caBs the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") to request a raid of his own factory. INS obliges,
arresting nearly thirty workers, and declines to fine the factory owner in light of
his cooperation on the raid. But this story has an unusual ending: the
Immigration Judge hearing the resulting deportation cases dismissed them, on
the grounds that the INS had violated its own internal rules restricting worksite
raids in the middle of a labor dispute,1 and the New York Department of Labor
successfuBy prosecuted the factory owner for violating its anti-retaliation statute
by caBing the INS to punish his workers. 2
It is weB known that many immigrants in this country labor long hours for
illegaBy low pay in perilous working conditions,3 and also that employers
frequently seek to control their non-citizen workers by threatening them with
deportation.4 Although occasionaBy acknowledged by senior immigration
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I. The facts of the labor dispute, retaliatory tip, raid, and dismissal are set forth in In re:
Herrera-Priego, U.S. D.O.J. EOIR (Lamb, I.J., July 10, 2003), at 7-11, 14-17 (terminating
proceedings based on INS violation of INS Operations Instruction 287.3a, an agency rule
restricting raids during labor disputes), available at http://www.lexisnexis.comlpracticeareas/
immigration/pdfsweb428.pdf. The cases were litigated over several years by students in the NYU
Immigrant Rights Clinic, including Hayne Yoon, Marielena Piriz, Anita Sinha, Mina Park, and
Benita Jain, together with co-counsel Alison Rosenberg and Muzaffar Chishti of UNITE!.
2. Id. at 16.
3. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) ("There are reportedly
over 5.3 million [immigrant] workers in the 'unauthorized labor' force ... Many of these workers
are willing to work for substandard wages in our economy's most undesirable jobs.").
4. ld. at 1064-65 ("While documented workers face the possibility of retaliatory discharge
for an assertion of their labor and civil rights, undocumented workers confront the harsher reality
that, in addition to possible discharge, their employer will likely report them to the INS and they
389
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officials,S it IS less well known that a substantial amount of INS worksite
enforcement correlates with the existence of formal labor disputes, despite
internal agency rules intended to limit INS involvement in employer-employee
struggles.6 By implication, an even more substantial amount of worksite raids
likely correlate with informal labor disputes, including disputes that have not yet
resulted in the filing of administrative or judicial complaints or union grievances.
That is, in many instances, and perhaps in a majority of cases, the reason
immigration agents7 receive a tip and conduct a raid is because a retaliating boss
(or, perhaps at times, a disgruntled employee) seeks an unlawful edge in labor
and employment relations. In practice, INS has frequently allowed itself to be
used as a tool of sweatshop bosses unlawfully retaliating against their workers.8
Evidence of the deep entanglement of immigration enforcement in labor
disputes is revealed in a statistical profile of worksite enforcement in one of the
largest INS Districts, New York City.9 The data set consists of the name and
address of the companies that were the subject of an INS raid in a thirty-month
period in 1997-99, and for which INS had closed its investigation file by the
date the data was released in June 2000. This listing of INS raid sites, 184 in all,
was compared to records of labor complaints filed with state and federal labor
and employment agencies in New York. The latter were gathered in response to
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") and Freedom of Information Law
("FOIL") requests seeking information about which of the 184 INS raided
companies, if any, were also the subject of a labor charge, petition, complaint, or
will be subjected to deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution ... The caselaw substantiates
these fears... As a result, most undocumented workers are reluctant to report abusive or
discriminatory employment practices.").
5. See. e.g., Louis Uchitelle, INS is Looking the Other Way as Immigrants Fill Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at CI (senior INS official acknowledging that in 2000, INS worksite raids
were rare "unless the employer turns a worker in, and employers usually do that only to break a
union or prevent a strike or that kind of stuff.").
6. See INS Operations Instruction 287.3a (Dec. 1996) (restricting INS raids in the midst of a
labor dispute), redesignated as § 33.14(h) of the INS Special Agent's Field Manual (Apr. 2000),
reprinted in 741NTERP. RELEASES 199 (Jan. 20,1997).
7. On March I, 2003, the functions of the INS were transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
8. It is well-settled that it is unlawful for an employer to contact INS in retaliation for its
employees' exercise of their labor rights. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984)
(employer who contacts INS in retaliation for workers' union organizing activities violates
National Labor Relations Act); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(employer who contacts INS in retaliation for employee's filing of wage and hour complaint
violates Fair Labor Standards Act); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053
(N.D. Cal. 1998) (same, as to communications with INS or Social Security Administration).
9. This profile is based on data obtained from a series of Freedom of Information Act
("FOlA") requests, some of which resulted in the disclosure of data only after the INS agreed to
settle FOlA litigation. See UNITE v. INS, No. 99 Civ. 1884 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. IS, 1999). The suit
was litigated on behalf of UNITE by Nina Zuckerman, Nanina Takla, Ararnis Rios, and Diana
Kasdan, all students in the NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic. See also Susan Sachs, Files Suggest
Profiling of Latinos Led to Immigration Raids, N.Y. TIMES, May I, 2001, at BI (reporting on
results of same litigation).
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other proceeding. The results indicated that 102 of the 184 INS-raided
businesses were subject to a labor agency investigation or proceeding. There
were 122 instances of a labor investigation or proceeding in all, since some INS-
raided businesses were subject to proceedings at more than one agency. Table 1
presents the data on labor investigations and proceedings at INS-raided
businesses, by agency.
Table I
Labor Investigations and Proceedings at INS-Raided Businesses, by Agency
Agency Number of Labor Investigations and Percent
Proceedings at INS-Raided Businesses (n=122)
US Dept. of Laborl0 8611 70.49
NLRB, Region 212 113 0.82
NLRB, Region 2914 1015 8.20
NY Dept. of Laborl6 25 17 20.49
NY AG Lab. Bureau l8 019 0.00
TOTALS 122 100.00
10. The U.S. Department of Labor ("US DOL") enforces the federal minimum wage,
overtime, and child labor provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 216.
11. Of these 86 US DOL investigations, 33 resulted in a determination of minimum wage or
overtime liability, 50 in a US DOL determination of "no violation disclosed," and DOL did not
provide the results for three investigations. The total figure, 86, is particularly striking because,
during most of the sample period, the US DOL had a forma~ arrangement with INS whereby DOL
agents investigating a wage-and-hour complaint were obligated to examine an employer's payroll
records for compliance with the immigration law requirement that only work-authorized
immigrants be employed, and to report any irregularities to INS. Memorandum of Understanding
Between INS and Labor Department on Shared Enforcement Responsibilities, reprinted in DAILY
LAB. REp. (BNA) No. 113, at D-I (June 11, 1992). As a result, advocates tended to discourage
immigrants from filing claims with US DOL. Although the agency agreement was modified in late
1998, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Department ofJustice, and the Employment Standards Administration, Department ofLabor, Nov.
23, 1998, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REp. (BNA) No. 227, at E-1O (Nov. 25, 1998), immigrants and
their advocates remained suspicious of US DOL and often refrained from filing complaints with
the agency.
12. The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") enforces the National Labor Relations
Act. NLRB Region 2 includes Manhattan, the Bronx, and Westchester and Rockland Counties.
13. Data obtained pursuant to a FOIA request (FOIA response on file with author).
14. NLRB Region 29 includes Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and Nassau and Suffolk
Counties.
15. Data obtained pursuant to a FOIA request (FOIA response on file with author).
16. The New York Department of Labor enforces state minimum wage and overtime laws.
See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 663(2).
17. Data obtained pursuant to a FOIL request (FOIL response on file with author). The
response indicated DOL investigations at 24 of the 184 INS sites, but omitted the overtime
complaints at H.C. Contracting, Inc., the location of the dispute described supra note 1 and one of
the 184 INS raids in the sample. Adding this yields a total of25.
18. The Attorney General's Labor Bureau also enforces minimum wage and overtime laws.
19. Data obtained pursuant to a FOIL request (FOIL response on file with author).
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Table 2 presents the data on INS-raided businesses that were subject to labor
proceedings as a percentage of the number of total INS-raided businesses.
Table 2
INS-Raided Businesses Subject To Labor Agency Investigation or Proceedings
Number of INS- INS-Raided Businesses
Raided Businesses Subject to Labor Agency
Subject to Labor Investigation or Proceeding
Agency Investigation as Percent of Total INS-
or Proceeding Raided Businesses (n=184 )
Subject to proceeding 84 45.65
atone labor agency
Subject to proceeding 16 8.70
at two labor agencies
Subject to proceeding 2 1.09
at three labor agencies
TOTALS 102 55.44
This data is dramatic evidence of the close relationship between labor
disputes and immigration enforcement. Fully fifty-five percent of the workplaces
raided by INS in the sample were the subject of at least one formal complaint to
or investigation by a labor agency. This figure likely understates the actual
number of worksites that were in the midst of a labor struggle at the time of the
immigration tip or raid, as the calculations do not account for union grievances,
litigation, oral and other informal complaints to employers, and complaints to
other administrative agencies (such as employment discrimination or workplace
safety agencies). Whatever the precise number, it is plain that a very substantial
proportion of worksite raids are close in time to, and likely prompted by, a labor
dispute.
One implication of the above data, confirming that the INS regularly raids
worksites engaged in a labor controversy, is that the Supreme Court may be
called upon to revisit its 1984 holding that the exclusionary rule is generally
inappropriate for civil deportation proceedings.20 In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the
Court relied explicitly on the asserted presence of sufficient training,
supervision, and internal management procedures to deter abuses by immigration
agents conducting raids in concluding that the exclusionary rule was
20. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1984) (applying a "balancing test to the
benefits and costs of excluding concededly reliable evidence from a deportation proceeding" and
holding that in general no such exclusionary rule need apply).
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unnecessary.21 The majority conceded, however, that "[o]ur conclusions
concerning the exclusionary rule's value might change, if there developed good
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were
widespread. ,,22 In 1996 INS adopted an internal agency rule restricting raids
amidst labor disputes,23 but the above data strongly suggests that the agency has
not implemented the rule in practice-eontrary to the Lopez-Mendoza majority's
premise that agency rules alone adequately deter abusive INS raid practices.24
The relationship between immigration enforcement and labor disputes is not
surprising, as some employers have long seized upon INS raids as a tool to
retaliate against workers and escape liability for labor violations. After all,
employers are rarely fined for hiring or employing unauthorized workers or
failing to maintain the required paperwork,25 and so those already willing to
flout labor standards may have little incentive not to violate immigration laws as
well.26 Nor is the relationship new, as this country's regulation oflabor markets
and of borders has long overlapped, from 18th century policies on slavery and
indentured servitude to contemporary debates on guestworker programs and a
new paradigm for U.S.-Mexico relations.
So what are courts, legislatures, immigrants, and their advocates to do when
confronted by apparent contradictions in labor and immigration policies? In
Herrera-Priego, the retaliatory raid case described above,27 the Immigration
Judge worked to harmonize immigration and labor laws so as to prevent the
employer from using deportation threats as a strategy for unlawful labor
retaliation. But a year earlier, the United States Supreme Court failed miserably
when it faced a similar challenge. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
21. Id. at 1044-45.
22. Id. at 1050.
23. See OI 287.3a, supra note 6.
24. Recent evidence that INS engages in widespread racial and ethnic profiling in its worksite
raid practices further undermines the foundation ofLopez-Mendoza. See Michael J. Wishnie, State
and Local Police Enforcement ofImmigration Law, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1081, 1102-11 (2004)
(presenting national and local data on INS profiling in worksite raids and airport inspections and
arguing data may "compel reconsideration" ofLopez-Mendoza).
25. In 2001, the last year for which INS has provided figures, only 113 warnings were issued
to employers nationally, 105 notices of intent to fine, and 66 final orders. 2001 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 5, available at http://uscis.gov/
graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ENF200Itext.pdf. These figures themselves are calculable only
by reference to the same figures published in 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 203; since 1999 INS has published these statistics only as
percentage variations from the 1999 numbers.
26. See Brief of Amici Curiae Employers and Employer Organizations, Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00-1595), at 14-23, available at 2001 WL
1631729 (analyzing economic incentives for outlaw firms to violate immigration laws, particularly
if such violation were to immunize firm from ordinary labor law liability). See also Robert 1.
Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY
LA RAzA LJ. 103, 139-40 (2003) (discussing economic analysis of employer amicus brief in
Hoffman Plastic).
27. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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NLRB,28 the Court held that an employer who fired a worker for participating in
union organizing activities was immune from ordinary backpay liability under
the National Labor Relations Act, where the employer learned only later that the
wrongfully discharged employee was also undocumented.29 The Court rejected
arguments that the nation's labor and immigration statutes worked together when
they removed incentives for employers to prefer undocumented workers.3o The
Hoffman Plastic decision was wrongly decided.31 It will no doubt cause further
exploitation of already-vulnerable immigrant workers, as well as an erosion of
the terms and conditions of employment for those who compete with them in the
labor market. But Hoffman Plastic now forms part of the legal landscape with
which workers must contend.
The articles in this volume address many of the urgent issues that arise at the
intersection of labor and immigration law, including those prompted by the
disastrous Hoffman Plastic decision. In her article, Julie Rivchin analyzes the
implications of the emerging workers' center model of immigrant organizing for
the rights of low-wage immigrant workers. Rivchin argues that workers' centers
often offer a different approach to holistic advocacy and grassroots leadership
than traditional industrial unions; she also explains the ways in which the
framework of labor law creates advantages and disadvantages for organizing
outside of traditional labor unions. Finally, Rivchin offers a comprehensive
assessment of legal and strategic considerations relevant to organizing within the
workers' center structure or in collaboration with labor unions.
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter illustrates the ways that the administrative
state has failed to protect farmworkers' health and safety and aptly develops a
theory of how tort litigation could improve field protections and compensate
victims of pesticide-related injuries. The article recognizes the limits of the tort
system but highlights the potential for relief for at least those workers whose
injuries occur soon after an exposure event. The article further argues that this
approach is useful to pursue because, over time, successful tort claims may lay
the groundwork for actions related to chronic injuries that result from long-term
pesticide exposure. Increased tort liability will create incentives for growers and
chemical manufacturers to establish improved protections for farmworkers.
Laura Lockard develops a theory for how farmworkers can bring private
actions against growers for health and safety violations under the Agricultural
28. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
29. Id.
30. Id. Justice Kennedy provided the key fifth vote in the Hoffman Plastic majority, which
was a particular disappointment in light of his previous recognition of the need to harmonize labor
and immigration laws. See NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If the NLRA were inapplicable to workers who are illegal aliens, we
would leave helpless the very persons who most need protection from exploitative employer
practices ....").
31. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. (forthcoming 2004).
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Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"). Lockard's innovative theory focuses mainly
on AWPA's prohibition against employer violations of the terms of any
"working arrangement" made with a farmworker. In her article, Lockard
illustrates that farmworkers can use AWPA's working arrangement provision to
enforce health and safety standards designed to protect farmworkers through
private rights of action against their employers. Lockard shows that this reading
of AWPA's working arrangement is consistent with Congressional intent,
judicial decisions interpreting AWPA, and is desirable from a policy perspective.
Professor Beth Lyon offers an insightful comment on the recent decision of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and its consequences for immigrant
workers in the Americas. Widely seen as a response to the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic, the Inter-American Court's Advisory
Opinion 18 provides an articulation of human rights norms and international
legal principles applicable to immigrant workers. Lyon considers the context of
the decision and the arguments addressed by the court; she concludes that OC- I 8
marks an incremental yet progressive development in rights for migrant workers
under international law.
In a report authored by Rebecca Smith, Amy Sugimori, and Luna Yasui, the
National Employment Law Project ("NELP") provides a survey of recent
developments in immigration enforcement and labor protection under state law.
The NELP authors discuss the impact of the Hoffman Plastic decision on a broad
range of worker protection remedies and immigrant access to social services.
The report offers guidance to law enforcement, local agencies, and worker
advocates in order to ensure protections for immigrant workers in the post-
Hoffman context. Smith, Sugimori, and Yasui also highlight relevant local
legislative campaigns and advocate further policy reforms.
These are difficult times for all workers, especially for non-citizen workers.
The participants in this colloquium examine a number of doctrinal and policy
questions that result from the tensions between, on the one hand, an immigration
statute that makes work unlawful, and on the other, a labor and employment
framework that endorses universal rights regardless of a worker's immigration
status, and that depends on public complaint and private enforcement by all
workers to deter employer abuse. In the absence of federal leadership, which to
date has been more characterized by empty promises than concrete deeds,32
these articles offer specific, ameliorative proposals. One can only hope that the
failed Hoffman Plastic vision of hollowed-out labor standards for non-citizens
will soon give way to one more closely resembling the Herrera-Priego modee3
of effective labor rights and tempered immigration enforcement.
32. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, New Temporary Worker Program: Remarks on
Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/01/20040I07-3.html).
33. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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